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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-4020
___________
DA CHEN CHEN,
         Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
                                                                                   Respondent
___________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A89-255-881)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Susan G. Roy
____________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 11, 2010
Before: BARRY, GREENAWAY and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 2, 2010)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Da Chen Chen seeks review of a final order of removal.  For the reasons that
follow, we will deny the petition for review.
       Chen testified that the contract required both he and his wife be in “farm1
production” to qualify.  He testified that he resided in an urban household and had an
accounting job.  The IJ noted that Chen’s household registry showed that they resided in
an agricultural household.  Chen stated that the information in the registry was a mistake
and should have listed their residence as suburban.  Chen stated that he knew of the error,
but forgot to seek to have the registry corrected.  (A.R. 51-52.)
2
I.
Petitioner Da Chen Chen, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China,
entered the United States in June 2007, and conceded eligibility for removal.  He sought
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”), predicated on his past persecution and fear of persecution based on his
resistance to China’s restrictive family planning policies.  Chen testified that he and his
wife had a daughter born in 2001.  Family planning officials then forced his wife to
submit to the insertion of an IUD, which she had removed by a private physician in
January 2006.  She became pregnant in April 2006 and went into hiding in her sister’s
home to avoid family planning officials.  Chen testified that before the birth of their
daughter, he and his wife entered into a birth contract that would allow them to apply for
permission to have a second child.  However, they did not apply for permission because
the contract required the applicant to be a farmer, and Chen was not one.   1
Family planning officials visited Chen’s home twice after his wife failed to keep
her gynecological appointments.  Chen testified that the officials suspected that his wife
was pregnant and threatened to force her to undergo an abortion.  They also threatened
       Chen gave changing testimony regarding whether he notified his supervisor about2
not coming to work during his detention, whether he was allowed to miss work without
obtaining permission, and whether he was fired because he missed work or because he
violated the family planning policy.  (A.R. 54-55.)
3
Chen with the loss of his job.  The officials returned to Chen’s residence again in
September 2006.  He testified that they began breaking his possessions and removing
items from his home.  When he protested, the officials beat him and took him into
custody.  He was detained for five days.  When his wife learned of his detention, she
surrendered and submitted to an abortion.  Chen testified that she was rendered sterile by
this procedure.  Soon after his release, Chen’s employment was terminated.   2
The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied relief, finding that Chen was not credible,
and that in any event, he had not demonstrated past persecution or a well-founded fear of
future persecution or presented any evidence that he would be tortured if returned to
China.  The IJ based the adverse credibility finding on 1) inconsistencies in Chen’s
testimony regarding the birth contract, the reason for his wife’s abortion, and the
circumstances of his termination; 2) the lack of documents that the IJ thought were
important to his claims; and 3) the failure of his wife’s affidavit to corroborate his
testimony or explain the absence of certain documents.  In addition, the IJ concluded that
Chen’s beating and detention at the hands of family planning officials and his job
termination did not constitute past persecution.  The IJ also found that Chen had not
demonstrated a well-founded fear of future persecution, nor had he sustained his burden
4of proof for withholding of removal or CAT relief. 
The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) agreed with the IJ’s conclusions and
affirmed, finding that Chen had not met his burden of proof under any of the applicable
standards.  Chen filed a timely petition for review. 
II.
We have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal under 8 U.S.C.                  
§ 1252(a)(1).  See Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2001).  “Because the
[BIA] implicitly adopted the findings of the Immigration Judge while discussing the IJ’s
conclusions, we review the decisions of both the [BIA] and the IJ.”  Issiaka v. Att’y Gen.,
569 F.3d 135, 137 (3d Cir. 2009).  We review factual findings, including adverse
credibility determinations, for substantial evidence, see Butt v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 430,
433 (3d Cir. 2005), upholding them “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Dia v.
Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 247 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).  Because Chen filed his asylum
application after the enactment of the REAL ID Act, the inconsistencies, inaccuracies, or
falsehoods upon which the adverse credibility finding is based need not go to the heart of
his claims.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 119 n.5
(3d Cir. 2008).  Rather, the REAL ID Act permits credibility determinations to be based
on observations of his demeanor, the plausibility of his story, and the consistency of his
statements.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). 
5III.
Chen claims that the adverse credibility finding is not supported by substantial
evidence.  He argues that the IJ’s determination is problematic because the IJ did not
consider his explanations and corrections for the inconsistencies and overemphasized
their importance.  He also claims that the IJ ignored both the documentation he submitted
and his explanation for why he did not produce documentary evidence of his wife’s
abortion (namely, that officials refused to provide her with any).  The BIA agreed with
the IJ that while some of the inconsistencies, standing alone, did not support an adverse
credibility finding, Chen’s testimony considered as a whole showed a lack of credibility.
 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1).
Moreover, the IJ and BIA did not rely on Chen’s inconsistent statements alone. 
Chen failed to provide any documentary evidence of his beating, detention, or of his
wife’s abortion.  The BIA concluded that the IJ was reasonable to expect such evidence
and to consider that Chen’s wife’s affidavit did not support Chen’s explanation regarding
the lack of documentation of her abortion.  We find that the IJ and BIA reasonably relied
on inconsistencies between his testimony and documentary evidence, as well as
inconsistencies in his testimony, to support an adverse credibility finding.
More importantly, the IJ and BIA found that, even if Chen’s testimony was to be
believed, he had failed to meet his burden of proof for asylum.  To establish eligibility for
asylum, Chen must demonstrate either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future
6persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.  See Vente v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2005). 
“[P]ersecution connotes extreme behavior, including ‘threats to life, confinement, torture,
and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or freedom.’” 
Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 2003).  It does not include “isolated
incidents that do not result in serious injury.”  Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 614-15
(3d Cir. 2005).  Although being forced to undergo an abortion constitutes persecution,
Chen cannot claim persecution based solely on his wife’s alleged forced abortion.  See 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); Lin-Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 147, 156 (3d Cir. 2009) (en
banc). 
Chen argues that he suffered persecution when officials beat and detained him, and
when he was fired from his job as a result of his resistance to China’s policies.  The BIA
noted that Chen did not seek any medical treatment and that Chen and his wife have not
had any further encounters with or harm from officials.  Further, Chen did not provide
any evidence to support his claim that his termination was related to his resistance to
China’s policies, or any testimony or evidence relating to the nature and extent of the
economic disadvantage he allegedly suffered.  As such, he did not show that he suffered
persecution from economic restrictions.  Accordingly, Chen has not met his burden of
proof for asylum.
As Chen has failed to meet the burden for asylum, he fails to meet the higher
7burden for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).  See Lukwago v.
Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 182 (3d Cir. 2003).  Likewise, the record does not support his
claim for CAT protection.  See id. at 182-83.  Accordingly, the BIA properly denied CAT
relief. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
